Filter List Generation for Underserved Regions by Sjosten, Alexander et al.
Filter List Generation for Underserved Regions
Alexander Sjösten
Chalmers University of Technology
Peter Snyder
Brave Software
Antonio Pastor
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Panagiotis Papadopoulos
Brave Software
Benjamin Livshits
Brave Software
Imperial College London
ABSTRACT
Filter lists play a large and growing role in protecting and assist-
ing web users. The vast majority of popular filter lists are crowd-
sourced, where a large number of people manually label resources
related to undesirable web resources (e.g. ads, trackers, paywall
libraries), so that they can be blocked by browsers and extensions.
Because only a small percentage of web users participate in
the generation of filter lists, a crowd-sourcing strategy works well
for blocking either uncommon resources that appear on “popular”
websites, or resources that appear on a large number of “unpopular”
websites. A crowd-sourcing strategy will perform poorly for parts
of the web with small “crowds”, such as regions of the web serving
languages with (relatively) few speakers.
This work addresses this problem through the combination of
two novel techniques: (i) deep browser instrumentation that allows
for the accurate generation of request chains, in a way that is robust
in situations that confuse existing measurement techniques, and (ii)
an ad classifier that uniquely combines perceptual and page-context
features to remain accurate across multiple languages.
We apply our unique two-step filter list generation pipeline to
three regions of the web that currently have poorly maintained filter
lists: Sri Lanka, Hungary, and Albania. We generate new filter lists
that complement existing filter lists. Our complementary lists block
an additional 2,270 of ad and ad-related resources (1,901 unique)
when applied to 6,475 pages targeting these three regions.
We hope that this work can be part of an increased effort at
ensuring that the security, privacy, and performance benefits of
web resource blocking can be shared with all users, and not only
those in dominant linguistic or economic regions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of millions of web users (i.e. 30% of all internet users [15])
use filter lists to to maintain a secure, private, performant, and
appealing web. Prior work has shown that filter lists, and the types
of content blocking they enable, significantly reduce data use [27],
protect users frommalware [26], improve browser performance [18,
28] and significantly reduce how often and persistently users are
tracked on the web.
Most filter lists are generated through crowd-sourcing, where a
large number of people collaborate to identify (by URL) undesirable
online resources (e.g. ads, user tracking libraries, anti-adblocking
scripts etc..) and generate sets of rules to identify those resources.
Crowd-sourcing the generation of these lists has proven a useful
strategy, as evidenced by the fact that the most popular lists are
quite frequently used and frequently updated [23, 31].
The most popular filter lists (e.g. EasyList, EasyPrivacy) target
“global” sites, which in practice means either websites in English,
or resources popular enough to appear on English-speaking sites
in addition to sites targeting speakers of other languages. Non-
English speaking web users face different, generally less appealing
options for content blocking. Web users who visit non-English
websites that target relatively wealthy users generally have access
to well maintained, language-specific lists. Indeed, the French [6],
German [7], and Japanese [10] specific filter lists are representative
examples of well-maintained, popular filter lists targeting non-
English web users. Similarly, linguistic regions with very large
numbers of speakers also generally have well maintained filter
lists. Examples here include well maintained filter lists targeting
Hindi [8], Russian [12], Chinese [4], and Portuguese [3, 11] websites.
Unfortunately, internet users who visit websites in languages
with fewer speakers, or with less wealthy users, have worse options.
Put differently, the usefulness of crowd-sourced filter lists depends
on having a large crowd, or an affluent crowd; filter lists targeting
parts of the web with less, or less affluent, users are left with filter
lists that are smaller, less frequently maintained, or both. Visitors
speaking these less-commonly-spoken languages have degraded
web experiences, and are exposed to all the web maladies that filter
lists are designed to fix.
Compounding the problem, in many cases, web users in these
regions are the ones who could benefit most from robust filter
lists, as network connections may be slower, data may be more
expensive, the frequency of undesirable web resources may be
higher. An example which motivates this work and illustrates the
inability of current filter lists to adequately block ads on a regional
website in Albania can be seen from the screenshot in Figure 1. In
this example, we browse the website gazetatema.net while using
AdBlock Plus (which uses EasyList, a “global” targeting filter list).
While there has been significant prior work on automating the
generation of filter lists [14, 16, 19, 24], this existing work is fo-
cused on replicating and extending the most popular English and
globally-focused filter lists, with little to no evaluation on, or appli-
cability to, non-English web regions. In this paper, we target the
problem of improving filter lists for web users in regions with small
numbers of speakers (relative to prominent global languages). We
select three regions as representative of the problem in general:
Albania, Hungary and Sri Lanka, using a methodology presented
in Section 4.1.
We describe a two-pronged strategy for identifying long-tail
resources on websites that target under-served linguistic regions
on the web: (i) a classifier that can identify advertisements in a
way that generalizes well across languages, and (ii) a method for
accurately determining how advertisements end up in pages (as
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determined by either existing filter lists or our classifier), and by
using this information, generate new, generalized filter rules.
We use this novel instrumentation to both build inclusions chains
(i.e. measurements of how every remote resource wound up in a
web page), and determine how high in each inclusion chain blocking
can begin. This allows use to (i) generate generalized filter rules
(i.e. rules that target scripts that include ad images on each page,
instead of rules that target URLs for individual advertisements),
and to (ii) ensure we do not block new resources that will break the
website in other ways.
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the following contri-
butions to the problem of blocking unwanted resources on websites
targeting audiences with smaller linguistic audiences.
(1) The implementation and evaluation of an image classi-
fier for automatically detecting advertisements on the
web which relies on a mix of perceptual and contextual fea-
tures. This classifier is designed to be robust across many
languages (and particularly those overlooked by existing re-
search) and achieves accuracy of 97.6 % in identifying images
and iframes related to advertising.
(2) Novel, open source browser instrumentation, imple-
mented as modifications to the Blink and V8 run-
times that allows for determining the cause of every web
request in a page, in a way that is far more accurate than
existing tools. This instrumentation also allows us to accu-
rately attribute every DOM modification to its cause, which
in turn allows us to predict whether blocking a resource
would break a page.
(3) The design of a novel, two stage pipeline for identifying
advertising resources on websites, using the previously
mentioned classifier and instrumentation, to identify long-
tail advertising resources targeting web users who do not
speak languages with large global communities.
(4) A real world evaluation of our pipeline on sites that are
popular with languages that are (relatively) uncommon on-
line. We find that our approach is successful in significantly
improving the quality of filter lists for web users without
large, language-specific crowd sourced lists. As our evalu-
ation shows, our generated lists block an additional 2,270
of ad and ad-related resources (1,901 unique) when applied
to 6,475 pages targeting these three regions.
2 SOLUTION REQUIREMENTS
A successful contribution to the problem of improving the quality
of filter lists in small web regions should account for the following
issues:
Scalability. The primary difficulty of generating effective blocking
rules for small-region web users is the reduced number of people
who can participate in a crowd-sourced list generation. While por-
tions of the web are targeted at large audiences (e.g. sites in English
language, or web regions with a large number of language speakers)
can count on a large number of users to report unwanted resources,
or generally distribute the task of list generation, regions of the
web targeting only a small number of users (e.g. languages with less
speakers) do not have this luxury. A successful solution therefore
Figure 1:Motivating example of the inability of current filter lists to
block ads on regional websites. Screenshot of a website in Albania
browsed via AdBlock Plus.
likely requires some kind of automation to augment the efforts of
regional list generators.
Generalize-ability. In most of the cases, ads are rendered by
scripts. In addition, every time an ad-slot is filled, the embedded
ad image may have come from a different URL. Approaches that
directly target the URLs serving ad-related resources then are likely
to becomes stave very quickly. An effective solution to the problem
would instead target the “root cause” of the unwanted resources
being included in the page, in this case the script, which determines
what image URLs to load. Approaches that attempt to only build
lists of URLs of ad-related images are therefore unlikely to be useful
solutions to the problem for the long term (as seen also from the
screenshot in Figure 1).
Web compatibility. Content blocking necessarily requires modi-
fying the execution of a page from what the site-author intended, to
something hopefully more closely aligned with the visitor’s goals
and preferences. Modifying the page’s execution in this way (e.g.
by changing what resources to load, by preventing scripts from ex-
ecuting, etc.) frequently cause pages to break, and users to abandon
content blocking tools. While filter lists targeting large audiences
can rely on the crowd to report breaking sites to the list authors,
(so that they can tailor the rules accordingly), filter lists targeting
smaller parts of the web often do not have enough users to maintain
this positive feedback loop. An effective system for programmati-
cally augmenting small-region filter lists must therefore take extra
care to ensure that new rules will not break sites.
3 METHODOLOGY
This section presents a methodology for programmatically iden-
tifying advertising and other unwanted web resources in under-
served regions. This section proceeds by describing (i) a high-level
overview of our approach, (ii) a hybrid classifier used to identify
image-based web advertisements, (iii) unique browser instrumen-
tation used in our approach, (iv) how we identify ad-libraries and
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other “upstream” resources for blocking, (v) how we determined if
a request was safe to block (i.e. would not break desirable function-
ality on the page), and (vi) how we generated filter list rules from
the gathered ad URLs.
3.1 Overview
Our solution to improving filter lists for under-served regions con-
sists of the combination of two unique strategies. First, we designed
a system for programmatically determining whether an image is an
ad, in a cross-language, highly precise way. We use this classifier
to identify ad images that are missed by crowd-sourced filter list
maintainers.
Second we developed a technique for identifying additional re-
sources that should be blocked, by considering the request chains
that brought the ad into the page, and finding instances where we
can block earlier in that request chain. We then apply this “block-
ing earlier in the chain” principle to both ads identified by existing
filter lists, and new ads identified by our classifier, to maximize
the number of resources that can be safely blocked. This approach
also allows us to generate generalized blocking rules that target
the causes of ads being included in the page, instead of only the
“symptoms”: the specific, frequently-changing image URLs.
We note that this approach could be applied to any region of
the web, including both popular and under-served regions. How-
ever, since popular parts of the web are already well-served by
crowd-sourced approaches, we expect the marginal improvement
of applying this technique will be greatest for under-served regions,
where there are comparatively few manual labelers.
The following subsections describe the implementation of each
piece in our filter list generation pipeline. Section 4 describes the
evaluation of how successful this approach was at generating new
filter list rules for under-served regions.
3.2 Hybrid Perceptual/Contextual Classifier
First, our approach requires an oracle for determining if a page
element is an advertisement, without human labeling. To solve this
problem, we designed and trained a unique hybrid image classifier
that considers both the image’s pixel data, and page context an
image request occurred in, when predicting if a page element is
an advertisement. Our classifier targets both images (i.e. <img>)
and sub-documents (i.e. <iframe>). Our classifier prefers precision
over recall, since for filter list it is more important to only block
ads, instead of blocking every ad.
3.2.1 Comparison to Existing Approaches. While there is significant
existing work on image based (i.e. perceptual) web ad classification,
we were not able to use existing approaches for two reasons. First,
we had disappointing results when applying existing perceptual
classifiers to the web at large. The existing approaches we consid-
ered did very well on the data sets they were trained on, but did a
relatively poor job when applied to new, random crawls of the web.
Second, we were concerned that relying on perceptual features
alone would reduce the classifier’s ability to generalize across lan-
guages. We expected that adding contextual features (e.g. the sur-
rounding elements in the page, whether the image request was
triggered by JavaScript or the document parser, attributes on the
element displaying the image) would make the classifier generalize
better.
3.2.2 Classifier Design. Our approach combines both perceptual
and contextual page features, each building on existing work. The
perceptual features are similar to those described in the Percival [30]
paper, while the contextual features are extensions of those used in
the AdGraph [24] project. The probability estimated by the percep-
tual module is then used as an input to the contextual classifier.
Perceptual Sub-module. The perceptual part of our classifier ex-
pands Percival’s SqueezeNet based CNN into a larger network,
ResNet18 [20]. While the Percival project used a smaller network
for fast online, in-browser classification, our classifier is designed
for offline classification, and so faces no such constraint. We instead
use the larger ResNet18 approach to increase predictive power. Oth-
erwise, our approach is the same as that described in the Percival
paper.
Contextual Sub-Module. The contextual part of our classifier
does not consider the image’s pixel data, but instead how the image
loaded in the web page, and the context of the page the image
or subdocument would be displayed in. Examples of contextual
features include whether the resource being requested is served
on the same domain as the requesting website, and the number of
sibling DOM nodes of img or iframe element initiating the request.
These features are similar to those described in the AdGraph paper,
and detailed in Table 4. The browser instrumentation needed to
extract these features is described in detailed in Section 3.3.
3.2.3 Classifier Evaluation. We built our image classifier in two
steps. First we built a purely perceptual classifier, using approaches
described in existing work. Second, when we found the perceptual
classifier did not generalize well when applied to a new, indepen-
dent sampling of images, we moved to a hybrid approach. In this
hybrid approach, the output of the perceptual classifier is just one
feature among many other contextual features. We found this hy-
brid approach performed much better on our new, manually labeled,
random crawl of the Alexa 10k. The rest of this subsection describes
each stage in this process.
Initially, we built a classifier using an approach nearly identical
to the perceptual approach described in [30]. We evaluated this
model on a combination of data provided by the paper’s authors,
augmented with a small amount of additional data labeled by our-
selves. This data set is referred to in Figure 3 as the “Initial Alexa
10k Set”. When we applied the training method described in [30] to
this data set, we received very accurate results, reported in Figure 2.
Later, while building the pipeline described in this paper, we
generated a second manually labeled data set of images and frames,
randomly sampled a new crawl of the Alexa 10k. This data set is
referred to in Figure 3 as “Alexa 10k Recrawl”, and was collected
between 2-6 months later than the previous data set1. When we
applied the prior purely-perceptual approach to this new data set,
we received greatly reduced accuracy. Most alarming of which,
for our purposes, was the dramatically reduced precision. These
numbers are also reported in Figure 2.
1the date range here is due to the majority of this data set being collected by the
Percival authors, 6 months before our work, with a smaller additional amount of data
being collected by ourselves later on.
3
Initial Alexa 10k Data Set Alexa 10k Recrawl
Accuracy Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall
Perceptual-only 95.9 % 95.5 % 96.4 % 77.0 % 48.8 % 87.4 %
Hybrid - - - 97.6 % 92% 75%
Figure 2: Comparison of classification strategies. The “perceptual-only” strategy refers to the approach in the Percival [30] paper, along with
several modified approaches (best numbers reported). The “Hybrid” approach uses a combination of perceptual and contextual features, and
performed much better on second, independent sampling of images and frames from the Alexa 10k we conducted, especially with regards to
precision.
# Images % Ads # Frames % Ads
Initial Alexa 10k Set 7,685 48 % 465 77 %
Alexa 10k Recrawl 2610 14 % 1,034 41 %
Figure 3: Comparison of the distribution of ads for images and
frames collected in each data set.
Content features
Height & Width
Is image size a standard ad size?
Resource URL length
Is resource from subdomain?
Is resource from third party?
Presence of a semi-colon in query string?
Resource type (image or iframe)
Perceptual classifier ad probability
Structural features
Resource load time from start
Degree of the resource node (in, out, in+out)
Is the resource modified by script?
Parent node degree (in, out, in+out)
Is parent node modified by script?
Average degree connectivity
Figure 4: Partial feature set of the contextual classifier.
We concluded that perceptual features alone were insufficient
to handle the breath of advertisements found on the web, and so
wanted to augment the prior perceptual approach with additional,
contextual features we expected to generalize better, both across
languages and across time. A subset of these contextual features
are presented in Figure 4, and are heavily based on the contextual
ad-identification features discussed in the AdGraph [24] project.
After constructing our hybrid classifier from the combination of
perceptual and contextual features, we achieved greatly increased
precision, though at the expense of some recall. We used a Ran-
dom Forest approach to combine the perceptual and contextual
features, and after conducting a 5-fold cross-validation, achieved
mean precision of 92 % and mean recall of 75 %, again summarized
in Figure 2.
3.3 Browser Instrumentation
In this subsection we present PageGraph, a system for representing
and recording web page execution as a graph. PageGraph allows us
to correctly attribute every page modification and network request
to its cause in the page (usually, the responsible JavaScript unit).
We use this instrumentation both to extract the contextual features
described in Section 3.2.2, and to accurately understand what page
modifications and downstream requests each JavaScript unit is
responsible for.
Our approach is similar to the AdGraph [24] project, but is more
robust (i.e. corrects categories of attribution errors) and broader
(i.e. cover an even greater set of page behaviors). PageGraph is
implemented as a large set of patches and modifications to Blink
and V8 (approximately 12K LOC). The code for PageGraph is open
source and actively maintained, and can be found at2,along with
information on how other researchers can use the tool.
The remainder of this subsection provides a high-level summary
of the graph-based approach used by PageGraph, and how it differs
from existing work.
3.3.1 Graph Representation of Page Execution. We use PageGraph
to represent the execution of each page as a directed graph. This
graph is available both at run-time, and offline (serialized as
graphml3) for after-the-fact analysis. PageGraph uses nodes to
represent elements in a web page (e.g. DOM elements, resources
requested, executing JavaScript units, child frames) and edges rep-
resenting the interaction between these elements in the page (e.g.
an edge from a script to a node might depict the script modifying
an attribute on the node, an edge from a DOM element node to a
resource node might depict a file being fetched because of a img el-
ement’s src attribute, etc.). All such page behaviors in the top-level
frame, and child-local-frames, are captured in the graph.
We use PageGraph’s context-rich recording of page execution
for several purposes in this work. First, it allows for accurately and
efficiently understand how a JavaScript unit’s execution modified
the page; we can easily determine which scripts made a lot of
modifications to the page, and which had only “invisible” effects lot
fingerprinting the user. Second, the graph allows us to determine
how each element ended up in a page. For example, the graph
representation makes it easy to determine if an image was injected
in the page by a script, if so what other script, and how that script
was included in the page, etc. Being able to accurately determine
what page element is responsible for the inclusion of each script,
2Link removed for anonymous submission
3http://graphml.graphdrawing.org/
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frame or image element is particularly valuable to this work, as
described in the following subsections.
3.3.2 Differences from Existing Work. The most relevant related
work to PageGraph is the AdGraph project, which also modifies the
Blink and V8 systems in Chromium to build a graph-representation
of page execution. PageGraph differs from AdGraph in several
significant ways.
Improved Attribution Accuracy. PageGraph significantly im-
proves cause-attribution in the graph, or correctly determin-
ing which JavaScript unit is responsible for each modification.
We observed a non-trivial number of corner cases where Ad-
Graph would attribute modifications to the wrong script unit,
such as when the script was executed as a result of an ele-
ment attribute (e.g. onerror="do_something()"), or when the
JavaScript stack is reset through events like timer callbacks
(e.g. setTimeout(do_something,1)). PageGraph correctly han-
dles these and a large number of similar corner cases.
Increased Attribution Breadth. PageGraph significantly in-
creases the set of page events tracked in the graph, beyond what
AdGraph records. For example, PageGraph tracks image requests
initiated because of CSS rules and prefetch instructions, records
modifications made in local sub-documents, and tracks failed net-
work requests, among many others. This additional attribution
allows for greater understanding of the context scripts execute in.
3.4 Generalizing Filter Rules
We next discuss how we generate generalized filter rules from
the data gathered by the previously described image classifier and
browser instrumentation. The general approach is to find URLs
serving ad images and frames using the classifier, use the browser
instrumentation to build the entire request chain that caused the
advertisement to be included in the page (e.g. the script that fetched
the script that inserted the image), and then again use the browser
instrumentation to determine how far up each request chain we
can block without breaking the page.
We build these request chains for both images (and frames) our
classifier identifies as an ad, and for resources identified by net-
work rules in existing filter lists (i.e. EasyList, EasyPrivacy and the
most up to date applicable regional list). The former allows us to
generalize the benefits of our image classifier, the latter allows us
to maximize the benefits of existing filter lists.
3.4.1 Motivation. Blocking higher in the request chain has several
benefits. First, and most importantly, targeting URLs higher in
the request chain yields a more consistent set of URLs. While the
specific images that an ad library loads will change frequently, the
URL of the ad library itself will rarely change. Approaches that
target the frequently changing image URLs will result in filter list
rules that quickly go stale; rules that target ad library scripts (as
one example) are more likely to be useful over time, and to a wider
range of users. Moving higher in the request chain means we are
more likely to programmatically identify ad libraries in addition to
frequently changing, one-off image URLs.
Second, blocking higher in request chains reduces the total num-
ber of requests, bringing privacy and performance improvements.
HTML Parser Script 1 Script 2 Ad image
<script> <img> <div> <div>
ins
ert
in
se
rt insert in
se
rt
insert insert insert
Figure 5: Example of a request chain, ending in an inserted ad image.
Blocking a single “upstream” ad library may prevent the browser
from needing to consider several “downstream” requests.
3.4.2 Building Request Chains. To generate optimized filter list
rules, we target not only the ad images and ad frames in each
page, but the scripts that injected those images and frames (and,
potentially, the scripts that injected those scripts, etc.). We refer
to the cause of a request as being “upstream”, and the thing being
requested “downstream”. We refer to the list of elements that par-
ticipated in an advertisement being included as its “request chain.”
For each <img>, <iframe> and <script> in a page, we determine
the request chain as follows:
(1) Locate each element in the PageGraph generated graph struc-
ture. Call this element X.
(2) Use the graph edges to determine how X was inserted in the
document. If X was inserted by the parser (i.e. it appeared in
the initial HTML text) then stop.
(3) Otherwise, append the script element X into the request
chain for X, set the responsible script element as the new X
and continue from #2 above.
A simplified result of this process is depicted in Figure 5. The
figure shows a simplified request chain, where a script was included
in the initial HTML (“script one”), that script programmatically
inserted another script element into the document (“script two”)
and that second script inserted an advertising image into the page.
We use these request chains to determine the optimal place
to start blocking, using the approach described in the following
section.
3.5 Safe Blocking in Request Chains
This subsection describes how we determine whether blocking a
script request is likely to break a page. We use this technique to
determine how “high” in each request chain we can block, with
the goal of determining the earliest “upstream” request we can
block in a request chain without breaking the page. Our approach
is “conservative” (i.e. prefers false negatives over false positives),
under the intuition that users would prefer a working, ad-filled
page, over a broken, ad-less page.
3.5.1 Determining Page Breakage. We use a pair of simple heuris-
tics to determine whether blocking a script is likely to break a page.
These heuristics are designed to distinguish scripts that only in-
ject ads into pages from scripts that perform more complex, and
hopefully user serving, page operations.
(1) If a script creates more than two subtrees in the document,
we consider it unsafe to block.
(2) If a script inserts another script that matches condition #1,
we consider it unsafe to block.
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(3) We consider all other scripts safe to block.
Less formally, if a script makes no modifications to the structure
of a page, or the modifications to the page are isolated to one
or two parts of the page (e.g. one or two ads, an ad and an “ad
choices” annotation, etc.) we consider it safe to block. Scripts that
add elements to more than two parts of the page, or include scripts
that do the same, are considered too risky to block, and too likely
to break desirable page functionality.
We note that this is only a heuristic, one that matches our expe-
rience building and debugging advertising and tracking-blocking
tools, but still only a heuristic. We choose the conservative figure of
allowing modifications to a maximum of two regions of the page to
favor false negatives over false positives (i.e. we’d rather allow an ad
than break a page). The larger problem of predicting whether any
given page modification breaks a site in the subjective determination
of the browser user is an open research question, and one that would
be its own complicated project.
3.5.2 Application to Filter List Generation. We use the above-
described heuristics to determine the highest point in a request
chain that can be blocked. For each request chain describing how
an advertising image or frame was included in a page, we select
the most “highest”, or earliest script request we can block, that will
not break the page. Put differently, we want to select the earliest
point in each chain to block, that will have have no “downstream”
breaking scripts.
As a demonstration, consider Figure 5. Our system would gen-
erate two filter rules for this request chain, one targeting the “ad
image”, and one targeting “script 2”. Our system begins by consid-
ering the most “downstream” request, the image element at the far
right. This image has been identified as an ad, either by our classi-
fier, or by existing filter lists. Using the browser instrumentation
described in Section 3.3, we build the request chain for this image.
Next, we try to consider the earliest point in the request chain
we can begin blocking. We observe that “script 2” only modifies
one other part of the document (inserting a single <div> element)
and so we consider this script safe to block. The next element in
the request chain, “script 1” inserts elements into more than two
parts of the document, and so we consider it “unsafe” for blocking.
3.6 Rule Generation
Finally, we describe how we turn the set of identified ad-serving
URLs into filter list rules. We do so through the following four steps
for each URL we determine to be blockable:
(1) Reduce the URL’s domain to its eTLD+1 root.
(2) Remove the query parameter portion of the URL.
(3) Remove the fragment portion of the URL.
(4) Remove the protocol from the URL.
We then record the modified (i.e. reduced) version of each URL
as a right-rooted AdBlock Plus format filter rule4. For example,
the URL https://a.good.example.com/ad.html?id=3 would
be recorded as ||good.example.com/ad.html, and would block
requests to https://good.example.com/another-ad.html and
http://a.b.good.example.com/ad.html?id=4, but would not
4https://adblockplus.org/filter-cheatsheet
Country # Rules # Network Rules Last Update Source
Albania 201 118 8 [1]
Hungary 1,407 662 3 [9]
Sri Lanka 69 42 22 [2]
Figure 6: Regional crawling data. The “Last Update” column gives
the number of months since the last update, relative to October
2019.
block requests to https://bad.example.com/ad.html. This ap-
proach is designed to generalize some (i.e. match other similar
requests, even when irrelevant details like tracking related query
parameters change) but not so much so that unrelated materials
served on the same host are blocked.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the approach to regional filter list gen-
eration described in Section 3 by applying the technique to three
representative under-served web regions. We find that the tech-
nique is successful, and generates 946 new rules that identify 1,901
advertising URLs missed by existing filter lists. These new rules,
when applied in addition to existing filter list rules, results in 24.2%
more advertising resource being blocked than when using existing
filter lists alone. We also find that our technique is useful in all
three measured regions, though to varying degrees.
This section proceeds by first describing how we selected the
three under-served regions used in this evaluation, then presents
the crawling methodology we used to measure popular websites
in each selected region, and follows by presenting the results of
applying our methodology to each of these regions. The section
concludes by presenting the output of our measurements (i.e. the
newly generated filter list rules), so that they can be used by existing
content blockers.
4.1 Selecting Regions for Evaluation
We evaluated our approach on three regions under-served by exist-
ing crowd-sourced filter lists: Albania, Hungary, and Sri Lanka. We
selected these regions after looking for regions that matched four
criteria.
(1) The national language was not a major world language.
(2) Had a popular sites listing on Alexa Top Sites.
(3) There existed at least one filter list for the region.
(4) We could purchase or gain access to a VPNwith an exit point
in the country.
Figure 6 presents the regions we selected for this evaluation,
along with measurements of the existing best-maintained regional
filter list. For each region we identified the best maintained filter list
for the region by consulting both the EasyList selection of regional
filter lists5, and the filter lists indexed on a popular, crowd-sourced
site of regional filter lists6.
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Country # Domains # Pages # Images # Frames
Albania 740 1,805 38,763 803
Hungary 935 2,287 46,687 1,698
Sri Lanka 890 2,196 47,092 1,242
Total 2,565 6,288 132,542 3,743
Figure 7: Measurements of data gathered from crawls of popular
sites in selected under-served regions. Given numbers are counts of
unique image and frame URLs.
4.2 Crawl Data Set
We next built a data set of popular websites and pages for each of
the three selected regions. We use this data set for two purposes:
first to approximate how internet users in these regions experience
the web, and second to determine how much advertising content
was being missed by existing content blocking options.
For each region, we first fetched the 1,000 most popular domains
for the region, as determined by the Alexa Top Lists. Next, we
purchased VPN access from ExpressVPN [5], a commercial VPN
service, that provided an IP address in each region. Third, we con-
figured a crawler to visit each domain and select two random child
links with the same eTLD+1. We then configured our crawler to use
our PageGraph-instrumented browser to visit the domain of each
site and each selected child page, each for 30 seconds. All crawling
was conducted from the VPN end point, to as closely as possible
approximate how the page would run for a local visitor.
After 30 seconds, we recorded the PageGraph data for each page
(note, the PageGraph data includes information about all network
requests issued during the page’s execution, in addition to the cause
of each request). We also record all images and scripts fetched in
the top-and-local frames (i.e. <iframe>s with the same domain
as the top level frame) during each page’s execution, along with
screenshots of each remote child-frame (i.e. <iframe>s of third-
party domains).
Figure 7 presents the results of our automated crawl. For each of
the regions we encountered a significant number of non-responsive
domains, which comprise the difference between the number in
the “# Domains” column and the 1,000 domains identified by Alexa.
While the 10% non-responsive rate for Hungary and Sri Lanka
is inline with prior web-studies [21] that find around 11% error
rate for automated crawls of the web, the even higher rate of non-
responsive sites in Albania was surprising. On manual evaluation of
a sample of these domains, we found a small number of cases were
due to anti-crawler countermeasures or apparent IP blacklisting of
the VPN end point. In a surprising number of cases though, domains
seemed to be abandoned and hosting no web content at all. We note
this as a point for future study.
4.3 Ads Identified by Existing Filter Lists
Next, we measured how successful existing filter lists are at identi-
fying and blocking advertisements on popular sites in our selected
5https://easylist.to/pages/other-supplementary-filter-lists-and-easylist-
variants.html
6https://filterlists.com
Country # Ad Images % # Ad Frames %
Albania 2,443 6.3% 578 72%
Hungary 1,301 2.8% 1,318 77.6%
Sri Lanka 1,360 2.9% 844 68%
Total 5,104 3.9% 2,740 73.2%
Figure 8: Measurements of howmany unique image and iframe ads
are currently identified by existing filter lists (e.g. EasyList, EasyPri-
vacy, and the best maintained filter list for each region.).
Country # Ad Images % # Ad Frames %
Albania 451 18.5% 0 0%
Hungary 549 42.2% 0 0%
Sri Lanka 512 37.6% 0 0%
Total 1,512 29.6% 0 0%
Figure 9: Measurements of howmany unique image and iframe ads
the classifier described in Section 3.2 identified that were not iden-
tified as ads by existing filter lists. Our hybrid classifier identified
a significant number of new image ads, but zero new frame-based
ads.
regions. We treated this measurement as our baseline when measur-
ing how much additional blocking benefit our approach provides.
Figure 8 shows the amount of advertisement identified by existing
filter lists.
We measured the amount of ad resources identified by existing
lists in two steps. First, we combined the best maintained regional
filter list for each region (listed in Figure 6) with the two most
popular “global” filter lists, EasyList and EasyPrivacy. Then, we
applied these combined filter lists to the image and iframe requests
encountered when crawling each region, using a popular AdBlock
filter list library [13]. We then noted which images and iframe
requests would be blocked by the current best filter lists available
to people in each region.
4.4 Ads Identified by Hybrid Classifier
Next, we identified how many advertising images and iframes we
missed by existing filter lists. We found a significant number of
both; our classifier identified 1,512 ad images and 0 ad frames that
were missed by existing filter lists. Put differently, our approach
identified 29.6% more ad images, and 0% more ad frames, than
existing filter lists.
We note that these figures only include ad images and frames
missed by filter lists; we observed a significant amount of overlap
between the two approaches. Figure 9 summarizes the additional ad
resources our classifier identified. Additionally, we note that while
our image classifier was successful at identifying many image-ads
missed by filter lists, it identified zero frame ads missed by existing
filter lists (i.e. all the frame ads identified by the classifier were
already identified by filter lists). We expect this is because frame-
based ads are served by a smaller number of easily identified ad
brokers, while injected image ads come from a wider variety of
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Country Current Lists Classifier ∪ Chains ∆
Albania 3,021 451 521 17.2%
Hungary 2,619 549 736 28.1%
Sri Lanka 2,204 512 644 29.2%
Total 7,844 1,512 1,901 24.2%
Figure 10: Measurements of additions to filter lists when applying
all steps of this work’s methodology.
The “current lists” column describes the number of ad-resources
identified by existing filter lists, the “classifier” column describes
ad-resources identified by our hybrid classifier but missed by
existing filter lists. The “∪ chains” column describes the number of
new ad-resources identified by applying our “upstream” blocking
approach to ad-resources identified by either current filter lists
or the hybrid classifier. The “∆” column describes the overall
increase in identified ad-resources provided by our techniques,
when compared to existing filter lists.
sources (and so aremore likely to go unidentified in regional manual
labeling).
We measured how many advertising images and frames current
approaches miss in two steps. First, we identified each image or
frame in the corresponding PageGraph graph data, and used that
contextual information to extract the contextual features described
in Section 3.2.2. Second, we used the pixel data of each resource to
feed the perceptual part of the classifier. For images, we used the
image file directly; for frames we used a screenshot of the frame
taken during the crawling step.
4.5 Generalizing Rules with Request Chains
Next, we identified additional resources that should be blocked by
examining the request chain for each ad image or frame, and find-
ing the earliest point in each chain that could be blocked without
breaking the page. We applied this “upstream request chain” block-
ing technique to both ad resources labeled by existing filter lists
and ad resources newly identified by our hybrid classifier. Doing
so allowed us to not only identify specific images and frames that
should be blocked, but to programmatically identify the “upstream”
libraries that caused those images and frames to be included.
We were able to identify 1,901 additional advertising URLs by
analyzing the request chains in this manner, an improvement of
24.2% in advertisement blocking in these regions. We note that
by following the methodology described in Section 3.5, targeting
these additional resources will result in more generalizable filter
rules ,by identifying both the individual ad image URLs and the ad
libraries that determine what ads to load. The approach described
in Section 3.5 also gives us a high degree of confidence that this
“upstream” blocking will not break pages.
Figure 10 shows the final results of our regional filter list method-
ology when applied to the Albanian, Hungarian and Sri Lankan
web regions. The “current lists” column presents the number of ad
resources existing filter lists identify in each region in our data set.
The “classifier” column gives the number of images and frames our
hybrid classifier identifies as ad-related that are not identified by
existing filter lists. The “∪ chains” column gives the total number of
Filterlist rule Applications
||www.koha.net/anketa/a.php 3
||grandoads.com/b.php 3
||hurpass.com/iframe/frm_index 2
||www.vs4.com/req.php 2
||commerce-static.heyoya.com/b2b/b2b_data.hey 1
||landcomputer.hu/landcomputerhp.html 1
Figure 11: Representative generated filter list rules, along with the
amount of times the rule was applicable during our crawl.
Country Network rules
Albania 222
Hungary 380
Sri Lanka 344
Total 946
Figure 12: Number of new filter list rules.
ad resources identified by applying the request chain approach (Sec-
tion 3.4) to images and frames identified as advertisements by either
existing filter lists or the hybrid classifier. The final “∆” column
gives the percent-increase in resources identified by our combined
methodology, when compared to using only existing filter lists.
4.6 Generated Filter-Lists
Finally, we generated filter lists in AdBlock Plus format to block the
advertising resources identified in the previous steps. We used the
rule generation methodology described in Section 3.6 to generate
946 new filter rules. Figure 11 presents several representative exam-
ples, along with howmany times they would have been used during
our crawls. We have made the filter lists available at7. Counts of
the total number of new rules for each region are presented in
Figure 12.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss broader issues related to the problem of
filter list generation and ad blocking, including possible next steps
and extensions for the described approach, and some limitations
and concerns for future researchers to consider.
5.1 Ad Ambiguity
A reoccurring issue in identifying and blocking online advertise-
ments is that many images and ads are context specific. An image
in one context might be core content in another. For example, an
image of shoes with the name of the shoe maker might be perceived
as an advertisement when positioned next to a news article, but
the same image might be desirable when placed in the middle of a
page on a shoes selling website.
We encountered an even more difficult case when labeling and
debugging the pipeline described in this work. We found a movie
sharing forum that used a number of banner ads (like the one
presented in Figure 13) from elsewhere on the web as a table of
contents, to show which movies had most recently been added on
7https://sites.google.com/site/longtailfilterlists/
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Figure 13: Example of an ambiguous ad image we encountered on a
movie sharing forum in Sri Lanka as part of the its table of contents.
the site. In such cases, the “ad-ness” of an image is not ambiguous,
its explicitly both an ad and desirable page content!
Crowd-sourced filter list generation approaches rely on the sub-
jective intuition of list contributors to resolve such difficult situa-
tions. Programmatic solutions have no such option, and so must
address a two tiered problem: first, how to identify images that
look like advertisements, and second, how to model subjective user
expectations of when an advertisement is desirable to users.
We find these problem presented by the intersection of these two
issues is unaddressed by existing literature (current work included)
Our resolution to this issue was that “ads are ads”’, that its the
job of ad blocking tools to block ads, and if a user is in a scenario
where they wish to see and ad, they should disable the ad-blocking
tool. How satisfying such an approach is will likely be task specific.
Thankfully, the number of ambiguous ads we encountered was low
enough that it did not affect the main focus of the work, but we
mention it as an interesting area for future research.
5.2 Alternative Image-Identification Oracles
This work used a unique hybrid approach for determining whether
an image or a frame was an advertisement. This is only one of an
infinite number of possible oracles the same pipeline could adopt.
While we designed our approach to be conservative in identifying
images (as described in Section 3.2), one could instead use a much
more aggressive oracle, if one was willing to accept a greater false-
positive rate in ad-identification, or was willing to accept sites
breaking, for additional data savings and privacy protections.
In this sense, our oracle represents just one web use preference
(less advertisements, but with a low tolerance for error). The same
broad approach, as described in this paper, could be used with other
oracles, such as those targeting just certain types of advertisements
(i.e. blocking adult ads), or certain types of web content in general
(i.e. blocking violent images).
While our goal in this work was to improve web browsing for
people in under-served regions, the described approach is not spe-
cific to advertising. The identify-and-prune-the-request-chain ap-
proach could be helpful in addressing many web problems where
human labelers are lacking.
5.3 Possible Extensions
We considered many additional features and approaches when de-
signing the methodology in this work. Here, we briefly describe
a variety of improvements we considered, but did not implement
because of time, cost or complexity. We list them as possible sug-
gestions to other researchers addressing similar problems.
Predicting Page Breakage. An important part of this work was
generating and testing useful heuristics for whether blocking a
script would break a page. The heuristics discussed in Section 3.5
have proven useful for us, but could be improved. One could, for
example, also consider the number and type ofWebAPI calls a script
makes, whether the script sets or reads storage, or any number of
other behavioral characteristics when trying to predict whether
blocking a script would break a page.
Tracking Protections. This work improves blocking advertise-
ments in under-served regions, but similar approach could be taken
to target tracking scripts. Instead of building a classifier to deter-
mine if an image is an advertisement, one would instead need an
oracle to determine whether a script was privacy violating. This
might be an easier task, since determining the privacy implications
of a script’s execution is in many cases easier that predicting the
subjective evaluation of whether an image is an advertisement.
Improving Other Filter Lists. The approach in this paper was
designed to help web users in under-served regions. However, the
same approach could likely be used to improve filter lists in gen-
eral, including “global” popular ones like EasyList and EasyPrivacy.
Though the marginal improvement would likely be lower, since the
relative popularity of such sites likely means a higher percentage
of ad resources have been identified by filter list contributors, our
approach could still be useful in improving blocking on less popular,
or frequently changing sites.
5.4 Limitations
Finally, we note some limitations of this approach, in the hopes
that future work might address them. First, while our approach
was successful on the three selected regions, its difficult to know
if these findings would generalize to all under-served regions on
the web. While such a measurement is beyond our ability to carry
out, it would be interesting to better understand how similar web
advertising is across the web generally.
Second, our approach relies on automated, manual crawls of
websites to identify ad-related resources. Its possible that the kinds
of advertisements reachable by automated tools are different from
the kinds of advertisements humans experience when on parts of
the web not reachable by crawlers, such as within web applications,
behind paywalls, or within account-requiring portions of websites.
This limitation is a subset of a larger open problem in web measure-
ment, of understanding how well automated crawls approximate
human user experiences.
Finally, the types of advertisements targeted in this work (i.e.
image based web advertisements) are just one of many types of
advertisements web users face. A partial list includes audio ads,
video interstitials, native text ads, and interactive advertisements. If
image- and frame- targeting ad blockers continue to become more
popular, we can expect advertisers to adopt to these alternative
advertising approaches. Researchers will in turn need to come up
with new ad blocking techniques to preserve a usable, performant,
privacy respecting web.
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6 RELATEDWORK
Below we cover the existing work related to filter lists (Section 6.1),
resource blocking (Section 6.2), and the importance of different
vantage points for web measurements (Section 6.3).
6.1 Filter Lists
In [31], Vastel et al. explored the accumulation of dead rules by
studying EasyList, the most popular filter list. Results of their study
show that the list has grown from several hundred rules, to well
over 60,000 rules, within 9 years, when 90.16% of the resource
blocking rules are not useful. Finally, authors, propose optimizations
for popular ad-blocking tools, that allow EasyList to be applied
on performance constrained mobile devices, and improve desktop
performance by 62.5%.
Gugelmann et al. in [19] investigated how to detect privacy-
intrusive trackers and services from passive measurements and
propose an automated approach that relies on a set of web traffic
features to identify such services and thus help developers main-
taining filter lists. Pujol et al. in [28] used Adblock Plus filter lists
for passive network classification. By analyzing data from a ma-
jor European ISP authors show that 22% of the active users have
Adblock Plus deployed. Also they found that 56% and 35% of the
ad-related requests are blacklisted by EasyList and EasyPrivacy,
respectively.
Iqbal et al., in [23], studied the anti-adblock filter lists that ad
blockers use to remove anti-adblock scripts. By analyzing the evo-
lution of two popular anti-adblock filter lists, authors show that
their coverage considerably improved the last 3 years and they are
able to detect anti-adblockers on about 9% of Alexa top-5K web-
sites. Finally authors proposed a machine learning based method
to automatically detect anti-adblocking scripts.
6.2 Resource Blocking
Iqbal et al., in [24], proposed AdGraph: a graph-based machine
learning approach for detecting advertising and tracking resources
on the web. Contrary to filter list based approaches AdGraph builds
a graph representation of the HTML structure, network requests,
and JavaScript behavior of a webpage, and uses this unique repre-
sentation to train a classifier for identifying advertising and tracking
resources. AdGraph can replicate the labels of human-generated
filter lists with 95.33% accuracy.
In [29], Storey et al. discussed the future of ad blocking by mod-
elling it as a state space with four states and six state transitions,
which correspond to techniques that can be deployed by either
publishers or ad blockers. They also proposed several new ad block-
ing techniques, including ones that borrow ideas from rootkits to
prevent detection by anti-ad blocking scripts. Zhu et al., in [32], pro-
posed ShadowBlock: a new Chromium-based ad-blocking browser
that can hide traces of ad-blocking activities from anti-ad blockers.
ShadowBlock leverages existing filter lists and hides all ad elements
stealthily so anti-ad blocking scripts cannot detect any tampering
of the ads (e.g., absence of ad elements). Performance evaluation
on Alexa top-1K websites shows that their approach successfully
blocks 98.3% of all visible ads while only causing minor breakage
on less than 0.6% of the websites.
Garimella et al. in [18] measured the performance and privacy
aspects of popular ad-blocking tools. Their findings show that (i)
uBlock has the best performance, in terms of ad and third party
tracker filtering, and least privacy tracking. They also found that
the time to load pages is not necessarily faster when using adblock-
ers, and this happens due to additional functionality introduced by
the adblocking tools. In [30], Din at al. proposed Percival: a deep
learning based perceptual ad blocker that aims to replace filter list
based adblocking. Percival runs within the browser’s image ren-
dering pipeline, intercepts images during page execution and by
performing image classification, it blocks ads. Percival can repli-
cate EasyList rules with an accuracy of 96.76% when it imposes a
rendering performance overhead of 4.55%.
6.3 Internet Vantage Points
Selecting different vantage points to browse Internet from is a quite
common technique in order to understand the different view of the
web different users may have. Jueckstock et al. in [25] design and
deploy a synchronized multi-vantage point webmeasurement study
to explore the comparability of web measurements across different
Internet vantage points. In [17] Fruchter et al. proposed a method
for investigating tracking behavior by analyzing cookies and HTTP
requests from browsing sessions from different countries. Results
show that websites track users differently, and to varying degrees,
based on the regulations of the country the visitor’s IP is based in.
Iordanou et al. in [22] proposed a system for measuring how
e-commerce websites discriminate between users. Authors consider
several different motivations for discrimination, including geogra-
phy, prior browsing behavior (e.g., tracking-derived PPI) of the user,
and site A/B testing. They found that the first and third motivations
explain more website “discrimination” than the second.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we address the problem of augmenting filter lists for
users of under-served, linguistically-small parts of the web. The
approach described in this work is amenable to full automation, and
with sufficient computation resources could be applied to any num-
ber of additional under-served populations of web users. Further, we
expect the same approach could be used to block tracking-related
resources too, improving privacy for under-served web users too.
The problem of poorly maintained filter lists in under-served
regions is significant. First, the current predominant approach to
filter list generation (i.e. crowd-sourcing) is poorly suited for these
web-regions, which by definition have less users, and so smaller
“crowds.” Second, in many cases, under-served areas of the web
target users with less income, and with less access to cheap, high
speed data; the users who would benefit most from ad blocking are
often the poorest served by current filter list generating strategies.
Third, existing filter list generation strategies that do not rely on
crowd-sourcing fail to consider web compatibility (i.e. breaking
sites), leaving under-served users with the unappealing trade-off
between data-draining, privacy-harming browsing, or, alternatively,
breaking web sites.
This work proposes a novel approach for generating filter rules
for under-served regions of the web. Our approach determines
10
whether images and frames are advertisements by considering per-
ceptual and contextual aspects of the underlying image (or frame),
and then using deep browser instrumentation to determine where
in the request chain we can optimally begin blocking requests.
We apply this approach to popular websites in three regions
currently poorly served by crowd-sourced filter lists, Sri Lanka,
Hungary, and Albania. Our approach is successful at improving
blocking without breaking websites. We generate 946 new filter
list rules that identify 24.2% new advertising resources that should
be blocked, improving blocking by 19.8% over the existing best
options for these regions. We are also releasing our generated filter
lists so that web users in these regions can benefit from them8,
along with the source code for our hybrid image classifier9 and our
PageGraph browser instrumentation10.We hope this work advances
the goal of improving the web for all users, no matter their location
or linguistic-community.
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